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Summary 
 
Over the past decades, two clusters of developments have been identified as challenges to the 
actual power of the sovereign nation-state as well as to relatively simple and easy models of 
the state assumed in political science and political philosophy. Analyses of and answers to 
these developments, internationalization (including e.g. globalization) and dehierarchization 
(including e.g. multilevel governance), still presume the continued unity of a society 
underneath increasingly fluid political structures. It is however reasonable to assume that 
changes in the political sphere are in some ways reflections of and in others reflected in 
changes in the social sphere. I therefore introduce a new framework for modelling social and 
political cooperation, reflecting the historical contingency of the sovereign nation-state. 
Behind this framework lies a different conception of order. In this pluralist rather than 
traditional understanding of political order, the building blocks are individuals and their 
voluntary and involuntary associations. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Contemporary political theorists rarely assume, as Rawls once did, that political theory can 
take the culturally homogeneous society with closed borders as a ‘simple’ reference point, and 
subsequently develop ideal theories which one may expect to be modifiable, with just a few 
technical tricks, to suit the complexities of real existing, far more complicated societies. Yet at 
a more fundamental level the alternative view of society as complex (as offered by e.g. 
multiculturalism, feminism and globalism) shares with the classic ‘simplistic’ view the crucial 
and problematic assumptions that political order as such is natural, that it is desirable, and that 
it does not really need to be justified explicitly. 
 
In this article, I shall argue that it is prudent to distinguish further between two concepts of 
political order. One is the more or less traditional view illustrated by contemporary (both 
mainstream and critical) political theory but also by the way political scientists sometimes 
tend to conceive of the sovereign state. Here, deliberately oversimplifying, order is 
hierarchically imposed, top-down, regardless of whether it is legitimized bottom-up – or even 
independent of actual popular consent. Unity or the desire for unity and cooperation are seen 
as normal, while secession, dissociation or autonomy are the phenomena that need to be 
explained. 
                                                 
1 Based on a public lecture given at the Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, Vienna, 26 February 
2008, and on my book Political Pluralism and the State (2008).Thanks are due to the audiences in Vienna, at the 
Dutch PSA Annual Meeting in May 2009 and at the IPSA in Santiago de Chile, July 2009, for their comments 
and suggestions. 
2
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Professor, Keele University, Staffs. UK. E-mail m.wissenburg@fm.ru.nl, Website www.wissenburg.org. 
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While this concept of order may be historically accurate on a very large scale, given 
humanity’s tribal past, it is less accurate today than it was 200 or 20,000 years ago; moreover, 
there is reason to believe that it is a morally undesirable concept of order. 
 
What I am going to defend is an alternative, pluralist way of conceptualizing order, polity and 
society – moving away in particular from the sovereign nation-state to a more ecumenical 
model that does justice to the role of individuals as moral agents, and as building blocks, 
origins and sometimes creators of society and polity. The state, the nation and sovereignty are 
historically and philosophically contingent phenomena, and the (hypothetical) alliance they 
form in the shape of the sovereign nation-state is even more contingent, a phenomenon that 
perhaps even exists only in the minds and books of social scientists and philosophers. If 
reality no longer fits this model, a new one is required. What I offer is a framework for 
developing such a model – that is, not a model in itself, but a framework for developing one. 
 
On the pluralist view, oversimplifying this perspective as well, order is created bottom-up, 
voluntarily or involuntarily, by individuals and their (in)voluntary associations, in response to 
the perceived needs and interests of an order’s constituent parts. Here it is synchronization, 
streamlining, cooperation and order that need to be explained and justified. Both concepts will 
be briefly illustrated by alternative readings of the political and constitutional history of the 
Netherlands, although many other histories and polities qualify as illustrations – among them 
the USA and Indonesia before and after independence, China since before the First Emperor, 
and especially the artificial states of sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
One reason to argue for the pluralist view is that it enriches normative political theory, while 
(as already claimed) its alternative is a morally undesirable concept. The pluralist concept far 
better suits other assumptions of multicultural, feminist, social liberal and (obviously) 
libertarian political theory – in general, all heirs of the Enlightenment – than the traditional 
view, which might even be seen as a contradiction of Enlightenment ideals of human 
flourishing. Although it is of secondary concern here, I believe that the pluralist view may be 
relevant to empirical political science as well, as it could help develop alternative 
explanations and (motivational) understandings of e.g. ‘failed states’ and of the continued 
wide-spread resistance to the European Union. 
 
 
2. The Traditional State 
 
Political science and political theory make assumptions and of course have to make 
assumptions about the existence and nature of the state and of society.  Those assumptions 
could always count on critique, both within and across disciplines, but today they are under 
heavier fire than ever before. Over the past two decades, two clusters of developments have 
been identified as challenges to the actual power of the sovereign nation-state, and thereby 
also as challenges to the viability of the relatively simple and easy models of the state used in 
political science and political philosophy (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1 Classic sovereign nation-state  
 
 
(Source: Wissenburg 2008) Arrows up represent demands, arrows down commands 
 
In ‘mainstream’ liberal Anglo-Saxon political theory, for starters, the dominant mode of 
thinking was, for a long time, the one expounded by John Rawls: we simply assume, for the 
sake of argument, the existence of a closed, not too deeply divided society and of a sovereign 
nation-state, and then develop and test principles of social distributive justice. At the very 
least, the state operates here as a constant – the question is not what it is, whether it is, or 
whether it should be, but what it should do. Even today, mainstream political theory still 
constructs at least one of the two, state or society, as a kind of ceteris paribus condition for the 
debate on morality in politics. In the philosophical debate on multiculturalism, for example, a 
degree of fragmentation of society is recognized, yet it is assumed that a desire will remain in 
all parties to preserve an overall structure of cooperation, an overarching society – and the 
state is still presumed to be one and indivisible. In the debate on global justice, between the 
cosmopolitan and what Thomas Nagel (2005) calls the political conception of justice, the 
parties disagree on whether peoples or nations form societies, or whether the world population 
as a whole does so or should do so. Yet in either case, the state, be it national or global, is 
again presumed to be sovereign and undivided. 
 
The debate on the state in empirical political science has gone through at least three or four 
partly overlapping phases over the past 20 years alone. First, after the fall of the Wall in 1989, 
particularly scholars of International Relations discussed a series of phenomena that I would 
collectively call ‘internationalization’. These include:  
 
(1) cooperation between states, institutionalized through the creation of common 
administrative or executive organizations with differing degrees of political autonomy; 
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(2) cooperation (military, commercial or other) regulated by treaties and administered by 
treaty organizations; 
(3) economic, social and cultural globalization and migration; 
(4) the application of national law to citizens staying and acting abroad (the most familiar 
examples concern paedophiles) or even the application of national law to non-citizens for 
crimes committed abroad against non-citizens (e.g. in Belgium crimes against humanity); 
(5) the growth of international law in general and international criminal law in particular; 
(6) governance, or ‘governance without government’: the phenomenon of states or 
departments participating in an executive or regulatory body as equal partners of other 
participants (NGOs, international organizations, corporations, etc.); 
(7) the European Union. 
 
All these phenomena and more constitute an internationalization of cooperative structures, 
and one of the aspects of internationalization discussed was its effect on the power of the 
sovereign nation-state, in other words, the question whether a rift existed or grew between 
legal sovereignty on the one hand, the claim to external non-interference and internal absolute 
power, and on the other actual political sovereignty, the ability to satisfy this claim. 
 
A second and more or less simultaneous debate existed in comparative politics and 
administrative science on what can be called dehierarchization: the redefining of central 
government, voluntarily or involuntarily and by itself or by others, as no longer simply the 
highest source of authority and power from which all rules for and all power of lower 
institutions emanate(s). The state would become, at least occasionally but according to some 
increasingly, just one of the boys: a partner along with other social actors, sometimes perhaps 
stronger but never completely overpowering, and either not having or delegating or 
renouncing power. Examples are: 
 
(1) the recognition by states of the authority of pre-state institutions within their domain (e.g. 
pre-colonial kingdoms in Africa and Asia, clan-like authorities on the Arabic peninsula) 
(2) border-crossing regional authorities such as Euregions 
(3) depoliticization of power: the state retreats from certain policy areas (misleadingly 
referred to as deregulation – misleadingly since rules, rights and duties do not disappear but 
merely originate in other spheres within society. ) 
(3a) in Muslim countries: the sometimes informal transfer of executive and judicial 
responsibilities from the state to organized religion,  
(3b) in the West, a transfer of power to civil society and, 
(3c) more recently, one of the defining characteristics of Third Way social policy, to the 
private sector (privatization); or 
(3d) the sharing of power with other authorities: multilevel governance 
(4) the separation of nation and state: regional autonomy 
(5) sub-politics (as described by Ulrich Beck 1997), where new political issues tend to be 
dealt with more and more in arenas other than the state, or with the state playing only a minor 
role – and where these issues either never even reach the agenda of the state, or are dealt with 
by others, pre-empting the state 
(6) again, the European Union. 
 
The (often complexly related and interwoven) processes of dehierarchization and 
internationalization together constitute what I call political pluralization: the emergence of 
‘polities’ other than the state, where polity stands for any form of social organization (e.g. 
arenas and institutions) within which (among other things) politics takes place. 
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The third and fourth phase in the development of the agenda of contemporary political science 
seem to occur more or less simultaneously again: some political scientists combine  
dehierarchization and internationalization and ask what it means for the power of the state, 
others, working on the interface of law, legal theory and political theory, take political 
pluralization as the background for a debate on the meaning, viability and possible 
reformulation of the concept of sovereignty (cf. e.g. Ilgen 2003; Prokhovnik 2007; Walker 
2003). 
 
Now, two observations can be made about the development of the agendas of political theory 
and empirical political science. First: analyses of and answers to internationalization and 
dehierarchization still presume the continued unity of a society underneath these increasingly 
fluid political structures. Society operates as a ceteris paribus condition. 
 
Secondly, political science and political theory have a problem that goes beyond normality, a 
problem that touches on their identity, on the object of research that defines their self-
understanding. The political science model of the Westphalian sovereign state, or worse, 
nation-state, no longer seems to reflect reality (if ever it did), and political theory refers to an 
apparently non-existent or not too really real-existing entity. 
 
It is against this background that it becomes reasonable to consider an alternative, more 
realistic, model of politics and society in which the sovereign nation-state is a purely legal 
fiction, lacking both political and moral sovereignty, that is, lacking both the actual power and 
moral authority to top the hierarchy of commands and rules in society. Ours is instead a world 
in which power is exercised and moral authority claimed, with equal force, by multiple actors 
next to or even competing with the state. 
 
 
3. State and Society 
 
The discrepancy between the concepts and the reality of the state is not the only problem for 
the traditional view of political order. Throughout the past twenty years, it seems that the 
unity of society remained a stable point of departure for political science and political 
philosophy, even when dehierarchization or multiculturalism became objects of research. The 
political superstructure of society may change, it may sever parts of society from the whole, 
adopt portions of other societies or even serve to the needs of several societies at once, but the 
building block remains “society”. Society may not be a concept as ideologically coloured as 
romantic, liberal and racist notions like nation or people are, yet as specifically 
communitarian versions of multiculturalism illustrate, it is still sufficiently morally 
‘burdened’ to raise the suspicion that it is a political construct emanating from a political 
agenda, rather than a natural phenomenon. More importantly, its moral and scientific 
desirability as an assumption in most work in the field is unquestioned – but no assumption 
should ever remain unquestioned. 
 
I would like introduce two assumptions at this point: first, that society itself is fragmenting 
just as much as the state is – and that is assuming undivided societies ever existed; after all, 
even France is a dream, and Iraq a nightmare. Secondly, I assume that there are causal and 
teleological links between political pluralization and social pluralization. For the record, by 
‘undivided society’ I mean a bordered network of social, repeated, perhaps even relatively 
permanent cooperative relations among individuals forming voluntary and involuntary 
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associations, including the network of relations among those associations. The term polity 
refers to a part of this network: the sub-network of political cooperative structures and 
associations where the rules and conditions for social cooperation are defined. 
 
It is not unreasonable to assume that changes in the political sphere can in some ways be 
reflections of and in others reflect in changes in the non-political social sphere. Change does 
not come out of the blue and it often goes noticed, it sometimes even has effects. One might 
even say that making this assumption is kicking in an open door the size of a small continent. 
But from this it follows that it may also be true that political pluralization reflects on and is a 
reflection of a pluralization of society, that is, that it reflects on and is a reflection of the 
creation of new ‘communities’ or spheres of social interaction.  
 
Society continually wipes out, splits off, gives birth to or adopts cooperative associations and 
clusters of cooperative associations, some more vital than others, and some so vital that we 
sometimes talk of societies splitting up in two – think of Hutus and Tutsis – or of societies 
merging into one – think of the 13 originally un-United States. Where societies split or merge, 
political structures adapt; they sometimes even precede secession or integration. Yet social 
and political pluralization may be concurrent but they are not necessarily congruent – political 
pluralization may go one way, say, away from unity, while counteracting social pluralization 
may go the other. Note that I do not wish to claim that all social pluralization is explained by 
political pluralization or vice versa – both may have other causes. 
 
A couple of examples may clarify the variety in origins of and responses to pluralization. 
First, there are instances where politics or political pluralization follows society, but where 
changes are non-congruent. A process like this seems relatively unlikely to happen in 
democracies, where politicians are after all slaves to polls, elections and the unpredictable 
preferences of the population. Still, the decision by some national governments not to repeat 
the experiment of putting the European Constitution to the vote via a referendum shows that 
exceptions exist. Other examples of non-congruent pluralization processes are the many 
attempts of the Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav governments to keep the state or states together, 
or – again in democracies as well – policies aimed at integration, citizenship, language skills 
and dress codes while Muslim immigrants appear to prefer increased segregation. 
 
Secondly, there are instances where politics follows society and the directions of both 
processes are congruent: the disintegration of Belgium comes to mind, but also the creation of 
a common market in Europe in response to demands from producers and traders. 
 
Thirdly, society sometimes follows politics in a congruent way – that at least seems to have 
been one of the aims of the whole process of European unification, and it seems to be the 
practice where consumers respond in their behaviour to the creation of a common market and 
to the introduction of the euro. 
 
Finally, society can follow politics and do so in a non-congruent way. Again, we would 
expect that to be rare in democracies and again, exceptions exist – the rejection of the 
European Constitution by the French and Dutch voters comes to mind, as do responses by 
some Muslim groups to integration policies. 
 
In other words: just like the sovereign nation-state, the concept of a unified and undivided 
society cannot remain an unquestioned assumption. It may not be true that “there is no such 
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thing as society”, as Margaret Thatcher supposedly once said, but it is certainly true that no 
one set of clearly delineated, undivided societies exists. More subtlety is required. 
 
 
4. Pluralist order 
 
One way to start designing more adequate models of political order, society and polity, or 
more precisely social and political cooperation, is bottom-up: we start with the individual in 
relation to other individuals, and move up from their networks through networks of voluntary 
and involuntary associations to the highest level, whatever that level may be. It is this bottom-
up approach that I want to defend here. Whether the bottom-up creation of order is a process 
aimed at order, a process with order as a by-product, or a process in which order is a property 
of an emerging system – representing three very different explanatory models in e.g. 
comparative politics – will not be discussed here: it distracts from the main objective of 
sketching the outlines of a pluralist alternative to the traditional concept of order. 
 
Two major reasons to opt for the bottom-up approach have to do with the methodology of 
political science. In so far as it is dominated by American and behavioralist traditions, it has a 
classic bias for explanation rather than interpretation, for erklären statt verstehen. This means 
first of all that individuals tend to be reduced to puppets on abstract economic, social, cultural, 
psychological strings. Yet we are sometimes agents. A behavioralist attitude fails to 
acknowledge this, therefore fails to understand what is really happening in politics. Also, it 
has by implication a bias for in a cultural way conservative, herd-managing political 
ideologies (including Marxism) and is therefore biased against reform- and agent-oriented 
political theories including liberalism. It is, in other words, by no means as politically 
impartial as one would want a good scientific paradigm to be. 
 
A third reason has to do with the dominant mode of thinking in political theory: the liberal 
Rawlsian paradigm. The liberal approach to political morality stresses the importance of the 
individual as a moral agent, and the importance of values like individual liberty and equality 
among individuals, partly as preconditions for moral agency. There is no space to explain here 
precisely how a philosophical paradigm that uses terms so typical for liberal political parties 
and ideologies, came to be embraced by republicans, social democrats and even communists 
but oddly enough not by classic liberals. In broad strokes, it has to do with the fact that this 
(Rawlsian) kind of liberalism aims to be as impartial as possible, in a way, a methodological 
rather than political liberalism. It is precisely for this reason that it seems inconsistent for 
philosophical liberalism to rely so heavily on varieties of the old sovereign nation-state and 
not to seek to develop an understanding of legitimate social and political institutions built on 
voluntary or rational cooperation among individuals. 
 
Central to the liberal tradition is the debate on the protection of liberal democratic values, 
which is to be judged from the perspective of the individual – and then we have to ask: what 
kind of cooperation is possible and legitimate? Instead, the agenda of the majority of political 
theorists theses days, including Rawlsians, is focused on the formulation of reasonable 
agreement under ideal, herrschaftsfreie conditions, and on formulating principles and rules of 
conduct derived from that agreement. The existence of society and state is taken for granted – 
but ultimately all initial assumptions have to be justified as well, and that makes the 
individual and (potentially) individual choices the point of departure: liberal political theorists 
cannot infinitely assume that individual X’s ending up in this or that society or group is an 
amoral given historical fact only, unlike X’s born and bred capacities and disabilities that are 
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considered morally relevant. Modern political theory cannot ignore the first question of 
classic contract theory: why should any individual, in his right mind and under conditions of 
free and deliberate choice, opt for the construction of this rather than that particular network 
of individuals and these particular customs, habits, rules, principles, convictions etc., rather 
than others. 
 
We could add a fourth reason for a bottom-up reconstruction of the concepts of polity and 
society: continental and particularly post-modern social and political thought, including 
feminism, points to the fragmentation of individual identity. We are gendered, sexual 
creatures with professions, hobbies, convictions, diseases and so on, and in each of these 
activities we are subjects of different discourses, and each of these constructs our identity 
slightly differently, resulting in fragmented individuals. One could argue that this post-
modern condition is merely a fad of rich, well-educated westerners with too much time on 
their hands, but that would not be fair – that would only explain the consciousness of 
fragmentation, not its reality for those who are not conscious of it but do live fragmented 
lives. A better response is perhaps that despite our different roles, we can create one 
personality for ourselves by prioritizing and ordering the value and truth systems of the 
discourses of which we are part. Even without the adoption of a fill-fledged postmodern 
perspective, we can accept that some sort of individual fragmentation is part of life. 
 
This brings me to a fifth reason to focus on the individual first: the place in our lives of civil 
society and the voluntary and involuntary associations of which it is made up. The British 
political pluralists of the 1900s to 1920 – Laski, Figgis, Cole and others, who by the way also 
inspired modern thinkers like William Connolly and William Gaston (2005, 2006) – feared 
and rejected sovereignty more than anything (cf. Nicholls 1975; Hirst 1989). They argued that 
all that individuals sign up for is the rules of the voluntary associations they join, not those of 
the involuntary association, the sovereign state, that claims they joined it. Any moral 
legitimacy the state enjoys must be derived from the voluntary allegiance of and contributions 
made to the voluntary associations of civil society. In place of the all-powerful state, then, 
pluralists defended a state that at best operated as an arbiter, primus inter pares, among the 
voluntary associations from which individuals could derive their identities and through which 
they could give meaning to their lives. 
 
If we ever want to understand why moral and political legitimacy so often conflict, we have to 
start with a model of society that allows us to perceive individuals and associations as creators 
of legitimacy, not merely as panel members. This implies that, like the British pluralists, we 
understand sovereignty as a legal fiction and stress the independence, power and legitimacy of 
voluntary associations against the Leviathan. In the words of William Galston, we should 
reconsider and reject ‘the understanding of politics (…) that tacitly views public institutions 
as plenipotentiary and civil society as a political construction possessing only those liberties 
that the polity chooses to grant and modify or revoke at will’ (Galston 2005: 23). 
 
 
5. A Pluralist Framework 
 
For the five reasons given above and others, it is prudent to consider an alternative conception 
of the polis, a new model of social and political cooperation reflecting the historical 
contingency of the sovereign nation-state and other types of political order (cf. Wissenburg 
2008). 
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Its building blocks are individuals and their voluntary and involuntary associations. Individual 
A will share more networks (say, a church, two environmental NGOs, a Star Trek 
appreciation society and a social network on internet) with B than with C (say, only church 
and environmental NGOs), while B and C are connected with each other through further 
associations, and so on. Some clusters of individuals, united by membership of one 
association, may be more or less congruent with other clusters defining other associations; a 
first step towards the creation of an overlapping ‘super’ association. Some non-congruent 
associations may serve the same purpose, and see this as grounds for (or experience this as the 
cause of – the precise function of order is, as indicated above, irrelevant for our purposes) a 
merger or (think of sports leagues) the creation of an association of associations. Other (super-
)associations (or their members) may constitute, join or be absorbed into still higher super-
associations regulating one or more aspects of the interactions between the constituent parts – 
as illustrated by e.g. protection schemes like state and mafia. 
 
On the bottom-up pluralist approach, it is no longer the state that commands directly or 
through institutions and the citizen who requests directly or through associations, a model that 
makes the individual a function of the whole. In the pluralist framework, ‘state’ and other 
imaginable political institutions are functions of networks, of voluntary and involuntary 
associations, which in turn are functions of individual cooperation. 
 
That does not mean that I would wish to defend the slightly ridiculous idea that every 
association is voluntarily chosen or created ex nihilo. Associations are formed against the 
background of or even out of already existing institutions, and that is – in the real world – 
only rarely done voluntarily. If one wants to interpret the pluralist framework as a model of 
social cooperation based on free choice, the pluralist framework can only be interpreted as a 
constant ‘becoming’ rather than something that can be, let alone is already, achieved. 
 
The pluralist framework is not an alternative model but literally a new point of view for 
developing models, including alternatives for the classic state model. It is a framework for 
modelling, a meta-model, not a model itself. Theoretically speaking, and that is purely 
theoretically speaking even on the edge of the age of quantum computers, theoretically then, 
one would first map each individual’s memberships of associations, then map overlaps 
between individuals, then add associations of associations, and on the basis of that map 
describe the more dense clusters of associations and individuals as cooperative social 
structures or as polities, and generalizing on that basis again, formulate models. With a bit of 
luck, political scientists may even, among those clusters, find some that closely resemble 
states, nations and even sovereign units. With even more luck, they will find other, new 
models emerging. 
 
An obvious next question is whether a pluralist conception of order cannot just describe but 
also help explain and perhaps even help to morally assess the long-term persistence of 
institutions including the state – a phenomenon that seems at odds with the constructivist 
individualism of the pluralist view of order. A creative misinterpretation of Jean Bodin’s 
conception of sovereignty may help us out here. Bodin’s Six Livres de la République 
(1583/1961) is, at first sight, the classic illustration of the polis as a republic. Yet a further 
analysis of Bodin’s key concept city (cité) allows a surprising new interpretation based on the 
letter of the text. 
 
There is, for Bodin, diversity within the republic: the cité can consist of several villages and 
towns with shared customs, the republic of several cités and provinces with diverse customs. 
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The subjects of a republic may be citizens with rights specific to the city, bourgeois with 
rights specific to a particular class of fortified settlement, simple villagers with villager’s 
rights, or parishioners with parish rights (Bodin 1961: 76). A cité may even consist of a union 
of formerly independent entities – Bodin mentions Bern and Fribourg as two examples of a 
union between three constituent parts, viz., two towns and a university. In other words: a 
republic is a union of cités, each of which may be constituted out of different and overlapping 
cooperative schemes. 
 
With this pseudo-Bodinian understanding of the cité in hand, it is a lot easier to square the 
existence of political superstructures with the pluralist idea that individuals already always co-
exist in voluntary cooperative structures. Like those ‘basic’ cooperative structures, 
superstructures are based on agreements, agreements that may be spontaneous or deliberative, 
culturally or historically evolved or a-historically designed. Like all cooperative enterprises, 
they will last as long as the foundation of the agreement lasts. What distinguishes 
superstructures is that they cover not individuals but cooperative schemes, the members of 
which are not necessarily always the same sets of individuals. In so far as cooperative 
schemes overlap the same individuals (and thereby their interests or reasons for cooperation), 
those individuals have a stake in coordination by means of a superstructure, and the more 
cooperative schemes a superstructure covers, the more it will tend to be stable, even more 
stable than its constituent parts. Other things being equal (those other things being e.g. the 
capacity to actually coordinate more and more forms of social interaction), the more ‘reasons 
for cooperation,’ or in Michael Walzer’s terms, the more social spheres a superstructure 
covers, the more stable it will be. 
 
Individual allegiance to a superstructure is, then, ideally and in an a-historical, justificatory 
context, a matter of a cost-benefit analysis. The costs of a worker’s income tax may be 
outweighed by the advantages that same individual gets as respectively a commuter, human, 
parent and citizen from the roads, hospitals, schools and legal systems taxes help to build. Of 
course, the term cost-benefit analysis is used very loosely; the factors determining allegiance 
are not simply costs and benefits measured by one single standard; they consist of all the 
different types of reasons on which the different types of cooperation rest, as well as on the 
kind of value attached to each of those reasons. Likewise, the prospect of being ruled by a 
heathen or a fanatic, no matter how beneficial that ruler may be in all other respects, may be 
incompatible with the foundational values on which a community is based; a shared religion, 
a shared ethical conviction, a shared dietary preference even may be a conditio sine qua non 
for cooperation rather than a mere calculable factor. 
 
Note that the possibility of legitimate stable superstructures does not automatically imply the 
inevitability, necessity or even overall advantage of the existence of a state. On the pluralist 
view, cooperative structures and superstructures are justified bottom-up, by and through the 
structures of social cooperation among individuals. Nothing precludes that one individual 
joins multiple superstructures or accepts them as authoritative in one area but not another; nor 
that a set of individuals participating in several but not all cooperative structures within that 
set share the same superstructure(s); nor that a cooperative like a town or a university 
participates in two or more superstructures and recognizes neither as absolute; nor, finally, 
that superstructures will form a state. Individuals participate in cooperatives, cités and 
superstructures, together forming one gigantic metropolis including all but hermits – yet the 
links between cooperatives can be structured differently for each single individual. Both in 
theory and in practice, all of the state’s tasks can be performed by distinct and separate 
agencies: legislation and adjudication can be split, as can the execution of security policy, 
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economic policy, health policy etc. There is no intrinsic reason why a state-like superstructure 
could not privatize its army or even its whole civil service; nor why the same institution that 
collects taxes should also spend them, nor why the same agency that collects and disposes of 
household garbage should also support the arts. There is no need even to think of actually 
existing states, let alone societies, as monoliths – to think of them both as multi-dimensional 
interconnected networks would be more accurate. 
 
On the pluralist view then, cooperatives and superstructures are tradeoffs between the separate 
interests and considerations of individuals as well as between those of cooperative schemes 
made up of individuals. Throughout most of history in most places, in so far as they were to 
any degree voluntary, they were built and sustained with the methods of power politics, terror 
and violence; where agreement and not will alone played a role, it was mostly in the form of a 
traditionally shared faith, popularity, myths like blood and soil or tribe/nation and 
xenophobia, or simply the absence of all means and opportunity to critically reflect on life.  
 
In some places though, like modern liberal democratic societies and societies touched by an 
enlightened form of communitarianism, people matter. The inevitable result of cooperative 
schemes, especially of the creation of superstructures, is an uneven distribution of power 
among people and their associations (cf. Beck and Grande 2004), hence uneven starting 
positions in the pursuit of a good life. Differences in intelligence, education, health, economic 
and social capital, and simply available time inhibit participation and adequate representation. 
Ideally, a truly sovereign (i.e., all-coordinating) nation-state can circumvent this problem, but 
only when it is a direct democracy in which all members are at least equally rational, equally 
intelligent and equally well informed. Reality does not offer this option; alternatives for a 
politically pluralized world are needed here. As long as superstructures allow or promote the 
execution of individuals’ plans for a good life, and as long as individuals are presented 
adequately, they will command allegiance, while loss of the fetish polity, loss of one’s herd 
identity and incommensurability will at worst be minor problems. But how is that possible 
without introducing yet more cooperative structures and rules? 
 
 
6. An Historical Illustration
3
 
 
If we think of political pluralization not as a development towards a utopian or dystopian 
anarchic goal, but simply as a process of devolution and reinvention of order, in which 
relatively stable superstructures can still unite other cooperative ventures, then we seem to 
move a lot closer to what students of the various forms of political pluralization believe is 
happening in today’s world. To make sense of the multi-faceted character of processes of 
state-transformation, internationalization and dehierarchization, many an author has turned to 
historical comparisons. Some, for instance, have argued that we are entering an era of ‘new 
Medievalism’ (Bull 2002). I would like to offer a different simile. One could argue that the 
present global political system, regional systems like the European Union and even individual 
states themselves show striking resemblances to the Dutch Republic of 1572-1795, famed by 
Locke, Descartes, Bayle and countless others as an example to the world in liberty, equality, 
tolerance and justice.
4
  
 
                                                 
3
 The first part of this section is an abbreviated version of a similar section in Wissenburg (2008). 
4
 Being exemplary does not imply perfection. The Republic at least excluded and sometimes oppressed and 
persecuted Jews, Catholics, deviant forms of Protestantism, women, homosexuals, non-whites and so on. 
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Indeed, the history of the Republic and its successors, the Batavian Republic and the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, are almost perfect illustrations of the presence of the two 
competing and contradictory concepts of order, and of the way the dialectic of those same 
concepts can help us understand other political histories as well, such as the processes of 
creation of the USA, its constitution and those of its member states; or the creation of post-
colonial states in Africa and Asia. 
 
The Dutch Republic (1568-1795) consisted of seven provinces united by a very limited 
number of institutions such as the Estates General, which survived the provinces’ secession 
from their Habsburg overlord (the king of Spain), and an even more limited number of newly 
designed national institutions. Each of the provinces had its own unwritten constitution and its 
own Estates (parliament) with representatives of the nobility and the cities, each of the Estates 
being composed in accordance with provincial law, the members elected in accordance with 
local law; each province had its own legal and tax systems, each its own armies, each its own 
rules for religious tolerance (or absence thereof), each its own system of land ownership and 
definitions of nobility. The same applied to the cities and communities: each its own degree of 
autonomy, each its own rules and definition of citizenship, etc. Over time, some but not all 
provinces or cities shared institutions. The provinces of Utrecht and Holland, for instance, 
shared the same chamber of accounts, and some but not all accepted the same person as 
stadholder, i.e., commander in chief of the army and acting head of state (read: province)
5
 – 
and from time to time some or all had eliminated the position of stadholder altogether. 
 
The similarities between the old Dutch Republic and today’s political reality are interesting 
and perhaps even striking, but the reason why I introduced this simile is not the Republic’s 
rise or greatness, but its fall. In 1795, after barely surviving a liberal revolution eight years 
earlier, the highly politically pluralized Dutch system finally collapsed, to be replaced first by 
a revolutionary liberal, centralized sovereign nation-state, the Batavian Republic (1795-1801), 
then by the increasingly more ‘classic’ Batavian Commonwealth (1801-1806), Kingdom of 
Holland (1806-1810) under Napoleon’s brother Louis, and (after an interlude under 
Napoleonic rule) in 1813 a kind of Ancien Régime restoring old elites and institutions within 
the framework of a centralized monarchy. 
 
The reasons why the Republic and its successor fell may shed some light on the prospects for 
political pluralization today. As usual, the reasons are many, some are less public or obvious 
than others, they are all intertwined, and their relative impact is open to debate. I shall limit 
myself here to those that one finds more or less clearly expressed in the Constitution of the 
Batavian Republic of 1798 (Rosendaal 2005). The most striking feature of this constitution is 
the very first sentence in which ‘the Batavian6 People’ constitute an indivisible state – no talk 
of provincial identities there. This was a response to what the revolutionaries saw as the 
inability of the Provinces to protect and promote the shared Dutch (Batavian) values 
expressed elsewhere in the constitution – enlightenment values like liberty, equality, religious 
tolerance and careers and opportunities open to all. In the years before 1795, the 
revolutionaries (then called Patriots) had already tried to overthrow the ruling coalition that 
                                                 
5
 Usually, but not always, the stadholder was a member of the Orange family, which slowly developed into a 
dynasty; the provinces finally made the position of stadholder hereditary. For a classic history of the Republic, 
see Israel (1995). 
6
 The term refers to a Germanic tribe whose capital is presumed to form the heart of the present city of 
Nijmegen. Since the early 17th Century, progressive Dutch historians presented them as the mythical ancestors 
of all the (Northern) Dutch, thus creating an identity above and beyond provincial allegiances. See e.g. Smetius 
(1999). 
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consisted of an ever weaker Orange dynasty,
7
 economically ever less important provincial 
nobles and an increasingly intolerant Protestant clergy. The 1798 constitution banished the 
Oranges and their supporters, abolished aristocratic prerogatives, separated church and state, 
gave equal rights to Catholics, Jews and Protestant dissenters, and even implicitly made room 
for atheists. It also redrew legal borders: the various constitutions of Provinces and cities were 
abolished, provinces and communities themselves replaced by departments and cantons 
operating under one national government. Representatives were now chosen by all tax-paying 
citizens rather than by those whose local position gave them the medieval prerogatives of 
nobles or burghers. 
 
The Batavian revolution is the exact opposite of political pluralization, i.e., political 
standardization and centralization, but it still fits the description of a cooperative venture (in 
this case, cooperatives including superstructures) based on a deliberative overlapping 
consensus and aimed (explicitly) at human emancipation; the liberal values expressed in the 
constitution are easily interpreted as expressing the reflective equilibrium among reasonable 
individuals at the time. As compared to the latter-day Republic, its institutions promised not 
only emancipation of the oppressed and exploited, but also more efficiency and effectiveness. 
 
Both the chaotic history of the Batavian Republic, where elites had been restructured but not 
replaced and where they organized counterrevolution upon counterrevolution, and the post-
Napoleonic restoration of 1813, supported by the victors over France, show however that 
power and reason are different things. In the 1814 constitution, the old prerogatives of 
nobility and patrician burghers and the old borders between provinces were restored, a 
Protestant state church was (re-)established and other faiths again excluded from public 
service, general suffrage was abolished and all references to human rights were deleted. Only 
the Batavian centralization of (now monarchical) authority at the level of the nation-state was 
maintained, although the Estates General were split in a House of Lords and a House of 
Commons in 1815. It took almost two centuries of slow but steady reform for the liberal 
values of 1798 to be almost
8
 restored: since 1983, the Dutch constitution again affirms the 
equality of all and separates church and state. 
 
Unlike the constitution of 1798, the 1814 constitution is a clear case of political pluralization 
– one that, however, does not qualify on the emancipation criterion. It expressed a modus 
vivendi, particularly between old and new elites, rather than an overlapping consensus. Even 
so, the modus vivendi was based more on the relative power of the old elites (backed 
externally by the Vienna Concert partners and internally by Orangists and low church 
Protestants) than on a deliberative agreement on basic values; unlike the liberal 
revolutionaries of 1795, the Orangists did not confuse (constitutional) form and substance 
(i.e., the actual distribution of power). 
 
The corruption and demise of the Dutch Republic and the history of its successors illustrate a 
number of points that have been mentioned before, but perhaps have not been stressed 
sufficiently yet. First and foremost: political pluralization may be a priori legitimate, it is not 
necessarily legitimate. Whether or not political pluralization is commendable depends not just 
on whether it implies an improvement in the administration of cooperative ventures relative to 
the status quo ante, but also on the point of view from which improvement is defined. It 
                                                 
7
 Though it had strong foreign supporters. Robespierre (2007: 84) aptly described William V, the last stadholder, 
as ‘not so much the prince of the Batavians as the subject of his wife, and consequently of the Berlin court’. 
8
 The position of the head of state is still hereditary. The one true gain on the 1798 constitution is the explicit 
recognition of the existence of women. 
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depends, in other words, on political feasibility on the one hand, on moral superiority on the 
other. Each case of political pluralization will be assessed differently not only in its specific 
context but also depending on the assessor’s specific theory of the good society. Secondly, a 
reorganization undoing political pluralization is, by the same token, not necessarily 
undesirable, though it turns out to be no more of a guarantee for basic human rights or other 
emancipation values than a ‘fuzzy’, politically pluralized constellation. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
If we could use alternative conceptions of order, alternatives for the classic models of closed 
societies and sovereign nation-states, as I argued we do, there are of course more ways to go 
about constructing such models. The pluralist framework is just one of them, but it has 
important advantages over other methods – particularly the most popular one, that of 
amending existing models. 
 
Note that this is also how the model of the sovereign nation-state came into being: it is an 
amended version of something older – the Hobbesian Leviathan, in which the king’s head has 
been replaced by an X or by ‘the government’. Hobbes’ model in turn is a simplified version 
of mediaeval models of the polity as a body politic, a metaphorical body, used by authors like 
John of Salisbury and Christine de Pizan to present prescriptions as if they were conclusions 
from common sense descriptions. If we go back even further, we will probably discover that 
the model of the body politic finds its roots in Aristotle, whose model will seems to be an 
inductively construed generalization of Greek political ideology and self-perception in the 
years before Alexander – a self-perception that was, by the way, remarkably blind to 
phenomena like annexation and colonization. 
 
The problem with amending models to suit a new time is that they rarely question the 
fundamental assumptions behind the original model. New models for the polity derived from 
the model of a sovereign nation-state will involuntarily but necessarily reify the sovereign 
nation-state, which is a model, not a real-existing thing.  
 
Amending that model means never asking whether society and polity are really hierarchically 
organized or really still or really predominantly hierarchically organized, or whether the 
perception of such relations is not perhaps evolving over time and in particular areas into what 
contract theory once proposed: the leader, the government, parliament as delegates and 
ministers, as servants and creations of their constituencies, perhaps even as unruly slaves. And 
those are questions that should be posed – the polity exists, after all, only in the minds of 
people, and it is not the self-perception of politicians that explains patterns of obedience and 
legitimacy, but the continuity or discontinuity of the rulers’ perceptions of their subjects and 
the people’s perception of their would-be superiors. 
 
Amending the model of the nation state also means never asking how representative the old 
model was in the first place – whereas we should: the sovereign nation-state can neither be 
found in the treaties of the Peace of Westphalia nor in the reality of most countries and 
territories. These are just two of the hidden assumptions behind the old model that simply 
amending it would keep hidden. 
 
The model of the sovereign nation-state is morally, ontologically and epistemologically 
biased, and any heir to the model will be so too. That is not to say, though, that the pluralist 
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framework, and behind it the concept of pluralist order, are in turn totally innocent, totally 
neutral and impartial. The pluralist concept of order does have both political associations and 
political implications – and while associations are relatively unproblematic, implications are 
not.  
 
The pluralist framework and the pluralist concept of order were developed to offer more room 
for an adequate understanding of political pluralization, and it does indeed help us to better 
describe and perhaps even understand some of the effects of political pluralization. Those 
effects could not be observed or described in the terms in which they must be described, 
without associating oneself with a roughly liberal or humanist view of life – but association is 
not the same as acceptation, let alone approval. The pluralist concept of order symbolized by 
this framework is certainly more in line with non-communitarian, Enlightenment-oriented 
conceptions of the good life and the just polity: it highlights the artificiality of order, its 
origins in individual, often conscious and even at times strategic action. It therefore allows us 
to observe aspects of the impact of political pluralization that a communitarian might not see 
– but it does not oblige us to appreciate them, in any sense of the word. 
 
As illustrations, I mention three such effects (for details see Wissenburg 2008). A politically 
pluralizing world is a world where individuals can count less on all-embracing systems of 
rules to organize their lives – the result being, at least potentially, incompossibility, loss of 
identity and loss of polity. Incompossibility is the existence of two rules that physically 
exclude one another: I cannot exercise my absolute freedom of movement with you exercising 
your absolute right of property to your car at the same time in the same place. Where, in a 
politically pluralized world, two powers claim authority through such incompossible rules, 
absurdity and sometimes chaos results. Loss of identity for the citizen is the result of 
voluntary or involuntary membership of more than one polity, each claiming allegiance and 
each offering a valuable cooperative surplus – and each thereby offering the citizen 
conflicting ultimate sources of political self-understanding and -definition. Loss of polity, 
finally, is the flip side of that coin: the inability of the citizen to determine which power is 
morally entitled to, and (usually more important) politically capable of, setting the rules in 
different spheres of social interaction. 
 
At the level of the individual citizen, understanding society and polity bottom-up from a 
pluralist perspective on order helps to bring out what from an Enlightenment perspective 
would be the dark side of these three effects of pluralization. While on the up side, political 
and social pluralization offers room for individual emancipation and for the realization of 
individual moral autonomy, the down side is that emancipation and autonomy depend on the 
willingness of powerful associations and powerful individuals to promote emancipation. A 
more communitarian commitment would lead to a totally different assessment, viz., one of 
political pluralization as disruptive, as fragmenting individual and collective identities. 
 
At the level of systems, the introduction of the pluralist concept of order allows us to 
understand political order (structures and institutions) as the result of a dialectic between the 
advocates of two ideals of order, the traditional top-down and the pluralist bottom-up 
concepts. In addition to offering grounds for normative assessments of real existing orders, 
both assessments of a justificatory and of a critical nature, a dialectical view offers workable 
and not immediately unlikely explanations and interpretations of the institutional and political 
structure of societies. We saw this in some detail in the case of the Netherlands, but a similar 
case can be made for other attempts to create order. When we add the pluralist perspective, 
the evolution of the United States is no longer a process of a central government imposing 
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itself on pristine territory, but a struggle between defenders of centralized versus fragmented 
government, rationality and efficiency versus traditional rights and freedoms. Likewise, on a 
pluralist view of order, the creation of ‘new’ (post-colonial) states in Asia and Africa becomes 
much less the artificial imposition of order and much more a continuation of an ancient 
conflict between centralizers and traditionalists. And likewise, a pluralist perspective helps to 
highlight an otherwise obscure factor contributing to the continued resistance against the EU 
Constitution (even after it was renamed a treaty and even after it was accepted): because of its 
interpretation of subsidiarity as top-down rather than bottom-up decision making on whether a 
policy issue should be dealt with at the central European or at a lower level. 
 
Understanding order as artifice, as the pluralist perspective stipulates, helps to see that it is not 
just disorder and secession that need to be explained, but that order and unity are equally 
problematic and at least equally in need of explanation. The introduction or rather rediscovery 
of this face of pluralism was long overdue. Understanding the evolution of political systems 
as a dialectic of centralization and fragmentation against the background of a pluralist concept 
of order adds a perspective on order that is not just plausible, workable and informative but in 
addition also – it seems – less biased, more balanced and neutral. 
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